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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JERRY RICKETTS, 
Plaintiff and Case No. 88-0208-CA 
Appellant, 
vs, 
V & H LEASING SERVICES, INC. 
a Wisconsin corporation, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, CIVIL NO. 
39279, THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS CORNABY PRESIDING. 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 4A of the 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals and pursuant to an Order of 
Transfer from the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. 
Jerry Ricketts appeals from an Order denying his Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and granting the Motion for Summary 
Judgment of V & H Leasing Services Inc., (V & H). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ON APPEAL 
Is an owner/lessor who retains no control over a vehicle, 
is not benefited by its use, does not select the maintenance 
contractor, nor provide liability insurance, liable to a third 
party for the lessee's failure to maintain the vehicle's 
parking brake. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arises out of personal injuries to Jerry Ricketts 
allegedly resulting from a faulty parking brake on a truck owned 
by V & H, but leased to Swanson Building Materials ("Swanson"). 
On November 24, 1987, Judge Cornaby granted V & H's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and denied Mr. Ricketts' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. R. 189. 
On August 15, 1980, V & H, a leasing company located in 
Marshfield, Wisconsin, leased a new 1980 Ford F700D truck to 
Mr. Ricketts' employer, Swanson Building Materials, on a 60 
month Business Net Lease Agreement. Swanson used the truck in 
its construction business in Utah. The lease required Swanson 
to provide liability insurance as well as to maintain the truck 
and make repairs. R. 103-108. The lease stated in pertinent 
part: 
MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS. 
(a) Lessee, at the expense of Lessee, shall 
maintain each vehicle and each part thereof in good 
working order and condition, properly serviced and 
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lubricated, and make all necessary repairs and 
replacements thereto . . . . 
R. 107. 
V & H did not send a representative from its place of busi-
ness in Wisconsin to Utah to inspect or maintain the truck after 
Swanson took delivery of the truck in Wisconsin on August 15, 
1980. Nor did V & H have any knowledge of any alleged failure 
by Swanson Building Materials to maintain the truck until after 
Mr. Ricketts filed his lawsuit more than four and one-half years 
into the five year lease period. V & H still has no knowledge 
as to whether any alleged failure to maintain the truck proxi-
mately caused the accident. R. 103-104. 
The operations manager for Swanson, Eric Eichbauer, was 
responsible for maintaining the truck in question and testified 
in his deposition as follows: 
Q. Now, if I understand you correctly, it was the 
responsibility of Swanson to do the maintenance 
or repairs on the trucks? 
A. You bet. 
Q. In other words, if there was something wrong with 
the parking brake, it was the responsibility of 
Swanson to get it fixed? 
A. Well, it was directly the driver's responsibility 
to come in and let me know, and then it was my 
responsibility to schedule the truck in to go 
down for servicing. 
Q. When you got it out here, you were responsible 
for the repair of the brakes or any other repairs 
that the truck needed? 
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A. As I stated, if the driver made me aware, as 
Operations Manager, the overall responsibility 
was mine, yes, sir. 
Q. And you didn't charge it back to V & H did you? 
A. No, we did not. Not after normal warranty. Even 
then, that would be handled by Ford Motor, not 
V & H. 
Eichbauer Deposition, pp. 21-23. 
On or about February 27, 1985, Mr. Ricketts was working for 
Swanson at a job site in Bountiful, Utah. The truck rolled 
backwards allegedly due to a faulty parking brake and pinned 
Mr. Ricketts' arm against another vehicle. Just before the 
accident, the truck was being driven by another Swanson 
employee while Mr. Ricketts was guiding that driver in a 
backing maneuver. R. 83-87. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Swanson admits that it was responsible for maintaining the 
truck. Assuming arguendo that Swanson was negligent in its 
maintenance work, the mere fact of ownership is insufficient to 
impute Swanson's negligence to V & H. 
There is no evidence in the record that V & H, four and 
one-half years after it transferred the vehicle to Swanson, had 
any notice that Swanson was not properly maintaining the truck. 
Furthermore, nothing short of a personal trip from Wisconsin to 
Utah to inspect the truck thoroughly could have revealed a 
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possible problem. Under the standard of "reasonableness" V & 
H's duty toward a third party such as Mr. Ricketts could never 
stretch so far. 
ARGUMENT 
MERE OWNERSHIP IS NOT SUFFICIENT AS A MATTER 
OF LAW TO HOLD A LESSOR LIABLE TO THIRD 
PARTIES FOR THE LESSEE'S NEGLIGENCE. 
As a general rule, a lessor cannot as a matter of law, be 
held liable for the lessee's negligence. "If the owner is not 
present in the car, but has entrusted it to a driver who is not 
his servant, there is merely a bailment, and there is usually 
no basis for imputing the driver's negligence to the owner. 
Prosser & Keaton on The Law of Torts, § 73, p. 523-24 (5th 
Ed.); Forrester v. Kuck, 579 P.2d 756 (Mont. 1978); Siverson v. 
Martori, 119 Ariz. 440, 581 P.2d 285 (1978); Nava v. Truly 
Nolan Exterminating, 140 Ariz. 497, 683 P.2d 296 (1984). 
Plaintiff's claim against V & H sounds in strict liability 
because it is based solely on the fact that V & H owned the 
vehicle in question. Plaintiff's argument is a radical depar-
ture from established Utah law. As the Utah Supreme Court 
noted recently: 
As a general rule, ownership of a motor vehicle does 
not alone subject the owner to liability for the negli-
gence of permissive users. 
Lane v. Messer, 731 P.2d 488, 491 (Utah 1986). 
The Utah Supreme Court noted that the only exceptions to 
the foregoing rule are when an owner permits a minor to drive a 
vehicle, negligently entrusts a vehicle to another, or the owner 
knows or should know of an unsafe condition of the vehicle. 
Id. at 491. Of the foregoing exceptions to the rule, the only 
one which could possibly apply in this case would be whether V 
& H knew or should have known of an unsafe condition of the 
truck. The record is clear that V & H did not have actual 
knowledge of any unsafe condition. Thus, the only issue before 
this court is whether V & H should have known of an unsafe 
condition. The record is without any such evidence. 
V & H operates out of Marshfield, Wisconsin. Four and 
one-half years of the five year lease had expired by the time 
of the accident. Under the Business Net Lease Agreement, 
Swanson, as the lessee, assumed responsibility for all mainte-
nance and insurance. Swanson readily admits its responsibility. 
Thus, both parties to the leasing contract clearly understood 
its terms. Plaintiff cannot sue the lessee, Swanson, because 
it was his employer. That fact has lead to this attempt to 
overreach the bounds of established law. 
Every court which has addressed a similar factual situation 
had refused, as a matter of law, to hold the lessor liable to 
third parties for the lessee's negligent maintenance. The only 
exception is a case cited by plaintiff where the court found an 
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agency relationship between the owner and operator who was 
responsible for the truck's maintenance. Kaley v. Catalina 
Yachts, 232 Cal. Rep. 384 (Cal. App. 1986). There is no 
evidence in the case at hand of employee sharing or anything 
else which would make Swanson the agent of V & H for purposes 
of maintaining the truck. Thus, the Kaley case is unpersuasive. 
Courts addressing a bailment or lease situation similar to 
that at hand, however, have all ruled as a matter of law in 
favor of V & H's position. Even a case cited in Mr. Ricketts* 
brief supports V & H's argument. Wilcox v. Glover Motors, 
Inc., 269 N. Carolina 473, 153 S.E.2d 76 (1967). In Wilcox, 
defendant Doranne Anders was test driving a used vehicle owned 
by defendant Glover Motors, when an accident occurred. The 
court found that a bailment had been created by the test drive. 
The court stated that although the statutory duty to maintain 
operative brakes rested on both the owner and the operator of 
the vehicle, negligence of one party in that regard would not 
be imputed to the other: 
The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove that the 
bailor at the time that he allowed the vehicle to 
leave his possession for such purpose, knew, or in the 
exercise of reasonable care and inspection of the 
vehicle should have known, that the brakes were 
defective. . . . The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
does not apply to a brake failure several hours and 
many miles after the delivery of the car to the 
bailee. 
Id. at 83. 
-7-
Mr. Ricketts cites Wilcox for the proposition that both the 
owner and the operator have a duty to maintain. That may be 
true, but in the absence of any evidence that V & H knew or 
should have known of a problem with the parking brake, summary 
judgment should be affirmed. 
In Forrester, supra., the court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the owner-lessor. There, the owner leased five trucks 
to the plaintiff's employer. Plaintiff's employer was required 
to repair and maintain the trucks and provide liability insur-
ance just as in the case at hand. The facts established that 
the lessee, plaintiff's employer, had absolute control over the 
use of the trucks which were engaged solely in the employer's 
business. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the owner-lessor which was affirmed on appeal. The appellate 
court held that liability for the negligent use of a vehicle 
cannot be predicated against the owner at common law merely 
because he owns the vehicle. 
The case at hand should have the same result. V & H had 
relinquished possession of the truck to Swanson four and one-
half years before the accident. Swanson was not an agent of V 
& H. Mr. Ricketts alleges, however, that because Swanson, his 
employer, may have negligently maintained the truck, V & H is 
responsible. Plaintiff's argument is unsupported by case law 
and directly contradicts the plain language of the lease 
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agreement which was clearly understood by the contracting 
parties. 
Nava, supra., is in accord. There, an airplane owner, 
Truly Nolan, had engaged the services of a Mr. Apodaca to 
repair the airplane. After completing the repairs, Apodaca 
recommended a test flight which Truly Nolan authorized. The 
plane crashed after take-off killing the pilot and a passenger. 
The crash was allegedly caused by the absence of counterweights 
on the plane's elevators. Plaintiff alleged the owner, Truly 
Nolan, was vicariously liable for the negligence of the pilot 
and was negligent in failing to discover and warn the pilot of 
a dangerous condition, i.e., the absence of the counterweights. 
While the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, 
the trial court entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict in 
favor of the airplane owner because there was not an agency 
relationship between the owner and the pilot or the repairman. 
The court noted that the Restatement defines "Agency" as: 
. . . the fiduciary relation which results from the 
manifestation of consent by one person to another that 
the other shall act in his behalf and subject to his 
control, and consent by the other to so act. 
Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 1 (1958). The court held 
that a bailment had been created rather than an agency stating 
that the primary distinction between an agency and a bailment 
is the bailee's freedom from control by the bailor and the 
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inability of the bailee to subject the bailor to liability in 
contract or tort. Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 12, 
Comment C (1958). 
In the case at hand, there is no evidence whatsoever of any 
agency relationship between V & H and Swanson. Swanson was 
never acting on behalf of V & H nor subject to its control. A 
mere bailment arose which is insufficient as a matter of law to 
subject V & H to liability for Swanson's negligence. See also 
Siverson, supra., (as a matter of law, the owner-bailor of the 
vehicle is not liable to a bailee or a third person for a 
dangerous condition which arises after delivering the vehicle 
to the bailee.) 
V & H does not deny that it owned the truck. Nor does V & 
H deny that the Utah Code requires vehicles to have adequate 
parking brakes.1 Neither the Utah Code nor the case law, 
however, makes the owner strictly liable as plaintiff suggests. 
An owner is liable for brake failure only if the owner's 
conduct is unreasonable under the circumstances. White v. 
xUtah Code Ann. § 41-6-145(b) (1979) states: 
Every motor vehicle and combination of vehicles shall have 
a parking brake system adequate to hold the vehicle or 
combination on any grade on which it is operated under all 
conditions of loading on a surface free from snow, ice or 
loose material or which shall comply with performance 
standards issued by the department. 
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Pinney, 108 P.2d 249 (Utah 1940); Hall v, Warren, 632 P.2d 848, 
851 (Utah 1981); Little America Refining Co, v. Leyba, 641 P.2d 
112 (Utah 1982); Maloney v. Rath, 71 Cal. Rep. 897, 445 P.2d 
513 (1968). 
The record is undisputed in the case at hand that the truck 
was new when delivered to Swanson. Swanson had exclusive con-
trol of the truck and it was used solely for Swanson's benefit. 
Swanson clearly understood its contractual responsibility to 
insure and maintain the truck. V & H had no notice of any 
maintenance problems before or after the time of delivery. 
Other cases relied upon by plaintiff stand for nothing more 
than the proposition that a vehicle owner who is also the 
operator of the vehicle has the duty of reasonably maintaining 
the vehicle. The rationale is that the owner is the party 
primarily benefited by the vehicle's use; he selects the con-
tractor for maintenance and insures against liability. Those 
cases are inapposite here because, the owner, V & H, was not 
the operator nor the party benefited by the truck's use, V & H 
did not select the maintenance contractor or insure the truck. 
Mr. Ricketts' brief is a tortured and misleading interpreta-
tion of statute and case law. All of the statutes and cases 
are in accord that V & H is not liable to plaintiff without 
evidence of one of the following: 
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1. An agency relationship between V & H and Swanson; 
2. Defective brakes at the time of delivery to Swanson; or 
3. V & H knew or should have known of Swanson's alleged 
negligent maintenance. 
There is no evidence in the record to support any of the 
foregoing theories. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, V & H respectfully requests that 
the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of V & H 
be affirmed. 
DATED this $T day of May, 1988. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By (Jk^t J^K^a^JZ^ 
^yOL. Sanders 
Attorneys for Defendant V & H 
SCMJLS258 
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